心の哲学の勉学事始め2-17 整理 |
20世紀半ば:Cartesian Dualism批判
*Behaviorism行動主義(B.F. Skinner:mental events can be reduced to stimulus-response pairs) 心は刺激ー反応のシステムにすぎない
*Vienna Circle Verificationism検証主義 (any proposition that was not an a logical truth or which could not be tested was literally meaningless)経験的にテストできない主張は無意味
*Scientific Reductionism科学的還元主義(物理学的説明に還元できるmental eventのみがリアル)、Mind-Brain Identity Theory(Smart1959):mental states could literally be particular states of the brain – so that for example some C-fibres firing in one’s brain would be identical with a specific feeling of pain.
*他:Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976)デカルトは身体の中にそれとは全く異なる実体である心があるとしている。この解釈では、心は「機械の中の幽霊」と同じ。
20世紀半ば以後(driven by computer metaphors)
*Functionalism機能主義(the important thing about mental states is not where they are located or what they are made of, but what function they perform) Alan Turing、Foder
*Neurological Reductivist Materialism神経還元唯物論:Paul and Patricia Churchland(‘eliminative materialism’, talk of mental states will eventually be abandoned altogether, in favor of a radically different view of how the brain works not identified with brain states. )Dennett
*Supervenience Theories付随主義:Donald Davidson、Jaegwon Kim(意識やクオリアは火にともなう煙のようなもの、煙同様物質に対して何の因果作用も及ばさない)
*Naturalistic Dualism自然主義的二元論:David Chalmers
現代の標準説: the Cognitive Science Program(equating mental phenomena with operations of the brain, and explaining them all in scientific terms)
*Objections to the Cognitive Science Program: Searle(強いAIは正しくない), the role of emotions, The Extended Mind〔心の範囲はHDや携帯にも及ぶ), 汎心論
*感想:心脳同一説に賛成。ただfolk psychology(素朴心理学)の諸概念はやがてすべて脳についての諸概念で置換えられ、捨て去られることになる、というのはあまりに楽観主義的。デネットが魅力的。